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Abstract: The paper aims to describe the effects of a unique combination of high 
autonomy and low outcome accountability of the Czech schools. First, the paper 
outlines test-based accountability as a key concept of contemporary educational 
policy. Next, the research design is brieϐly described and the qualitative data on the 
effects of school choice and curriculum autonomy / decentralisation are presented. 
The discussion stresses the problem of time frame in evaluating system wide 
interventions and also sketches a vision of new emerging school reform discourse. 
Processes of change in ϐive Czech “combined” primary and lower secondary schools 
were studied by qualitative longitudinal multiple case study for over 5 years. 
Surprisingly, the results suggest that many negative effects ascribed to the high-
stakes tests (e. g. curriculum narrowing, fabrication of image) could be seen in the 
studied schools despite the different model of governance in the Czech Republic. The 
contemporary discussion of risks of (high stake) testing should be complemented 
by a similar analysis of both costs and negative effects of the absence of outcome 
accountability.
Keywords: school improvement, educational reform, transition, Czech Republic, 
multiple case study
Standardised testing and accountability became mainstream policies across 
many dimensions of school life, not only in their traditional strongholds in 
Western Europe and North America, but also in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Eurydice, 2009; UNESCO, 2007). Many academics, however, complain 
about the “totalizing and terroristic dominance” (Chua, 2009, p. 160) of this 
discourse of performance and enumerate the unintended and/or negative 
effects of these policies. We discuss a complementary problem here. The 
primary and lower secondary schools in the Czech Republic were granted 
1 This research was supported by the GA ČR grant P407/12/2262 (Proměny české školy: 
longitudinální studie změny instituce v podmínkách vzdělávací reformy).
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an extremely high degree of autonomy but no national data about pupil 
outcomes were collected by state authorities. In this paper, we describe 
some effects of this unique combination of high autonomy and low outcome 
accountability on the behaviour of schools.
1 Theoretical and historical contexts
Accountability is a policy promoted by national governments and 
transnational actors as a strategy for attacking low quality and inequity 
in education as well as in other public services. Under process (input) 
accountability teachers or schools are expected to use certain methods 
and strategies to achieve the goals of education. Outcome accountability 
(accountability for results) means that schools should generate measureable 
outcomes (usually test results) without the need to prove how they did it. In 
reality blended systems are often used (Tetlock et al., 2013). Many authors, 
however, use the term “school accountability“ as an equivalent for the 
outcome accountability systems only.
Outcome accountability systems usually evaluate the school performance 
on the basis of standardised assessment results (test-based accountability). 
Bruns, Filmer and Petrinos (2011, pp. 2–3) list three key lines of accountability 
for results: (1) information reforms publicise the data about school results to 
enable the pupils and their parents to make choices and hold the providers 
accountable; (2) reforms of school management provide the schools with 
increased autonomy to control key resources (money, people, curriculum 
etc.); (3) under incentive policies teachers or the whole schools are sanctioned 
for the results. 2 The publicised and/or sanctioned results tend to be based 
on testing aligned with performance standards.
School accountability reforms often go hand in hand with another reform 
policy – parental choice of schools creating a (quasi) market in education. 
An accountability system indicates to parents whether individual schools 
provide adequate education. The school choice policy gives them the right to 
choose a school for their child using the information on how well schools are 
doing (West & Peterson, 2006). As well as in any other sector, for educational 
market to work reliable information must be available (OECD, 2013c).
2 Complementary strategies are the involvement of private sector to create more competitive 
market for education and reforms devolution of powers and resources from central Ministry 
of Education to regional level of governance (Bruns, Filmer, & Petrinos, 2011, p. 21).
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Despite the widespread use of outcome accountability in many developed 
as well developing countries, this educational policy is denounced by many 
critics. According to its opponents, the accountability policies based on 
standardised testing are not effective in achieving the intended goal – “raising 
the bar and closing the gap”. Besides, the high-stakes testing is believed to 
have many unintended negative effects such as the de-professionalisation of 
teachers, teaching to the test – narrowing the curriculum and overemphasizing 
decontextualized skills, cheating and many others (e. g., Bellmann & Weiß, 
2009; de Wolf & Janssens, 2007).
While the accountability policies (or high-stakes testing) are subject to 
intense critique, there is broad agreement that “learning outcomes should 
be monitored” (Unesco, 2007, p. 67). Pupil learning assessments provide 
the indispensable feedback to policy-makers. The tests based on sample 
surveys may be used for system monitoring purposes. Despite that, some 
low-stake assessments test the whole pupil population to provide every 
child of a certain age (and the parents) with information about his or her 
strengths and weaknesses and about his or her knowledge and skills across 
the classroom, school, region or the whole school system.
2.1 Accountability and reforms in the Czech Republic
Historically in Central Europe the traditional and very inϐluential German 
model of schooling promoted neither the use of standardised assessment 
nor accountability. The governance of school systems was based on the 
bureaucratic/professional mechanisms of a high degree of centralised state 
regulation. The state supervision was focused on a prescription of inputs/
processes, not on the measurement of outcomes. According to Humboldtian 
vision of education expressed in the term Bildung,
what is most important about education – the aesthetic ends, the search for 
freedom and truth, the ennobling exposure to history and so on – is simply not 
measurable. And so it was not measured. The national government had no legal 
authority to measure pupil achievement or progress, the teachers were opposed 
and the states had no interest in measuring these things. (OECD, 2011a, p. 208)
Despite that, the important countries in Central Europe like Poland and, above 
all, the Federal Republic of Germany (Klieme et al., 2004; Neumann, Fischer, 
& Kauertz, 2010) introduced nation-wide compulsory testing in their educa-
tional systems. Schools in these countries are now required to demonstrate 
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measurable learning outcomes. Overall the prevalence of national assess-
ments in Central and Eastern Europe increased from 25% to 65% between 
the 1990s and the 2000s (Unesco, 2007, p. 69). The Eurydice (2009) study 
found that the vast majority of EU countries use national tests at primary 
and lower secondary levels. Only the Czech Republic, Greece, and Liechten-
stein did not hold the national tests in 2009.3 Thus the Czech Republic, with 
no national assessment (neither high-stakes nor low-stakes) of learning 
in primary and lower secondary schools, has become quite a unique case.4
In the 1990s, after the collapse of Communism, the early system-wide reforms 
that were performed by the right-wing governments were strongly inϐluenced 
by the neoliberal ideology. The reforms granted parents considerable choice 
over which school their child would attend. It was expected that the parents’ 
right to choose the school that best served their child and ϐinancing per 
capita would stimulate the competition among schools, and in long term 
would increase the quality of teaching, learning and educational outcomes. 
This market mechanism, however, was transplanted into a Central European 
context that was hostile to the idea of testing for information accountability 
purposes at that time. So the key assumption of the market – that parents 
have the necessary information to choose the schools (OECD, 2013c, p. 54) – 
was not fulϐilled. Some leading Czech or Slovak academics’ critical voices echo 
their Western counterparts and continue to denounce not only the policies 
based on the testing as neo-liberal governmentality, but also problematise 
the use of (standardised) achievement tests for assessment purposes per se 
(e. g. Štech, 2011; Kaščák & Pupala, 2011, 2012). 
In the ϐirst decade of the new century, the responsibility of Czech schools 
for resource allocation has increased substantially.5 School directors have 
great control over budgets and staff now but the other side of the coin is 
represented by an increase in administrative burden on school directors. 
Everyday responsibilities of school principals (ϐinancial, legal and personal 
3 A small German-speaking community in Belgium and Wales did not use the national tests 
either but in the latter case this praxis has been disputed as the achievement of Welsh pupils 
is poor when compared to the rest of the United Kingdom.
4 Two attempts to introduce compulsory tests in the last grade of both primary and lower 
secondary schools (grade 5 and grade 9) were discontinued within the past ten years. The 
schools can use the tests developed and sold by several commercial providers. Since 2014, the 
national tests for system-level monitoring based of sample surveys shall be run every year.
5 The transformation to the new legal status giving the school greater responsibility for re-
source allocation has been optional since 1990s and obligatory for every school since 2003.
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management issues) leave virtually no time for the instructional leadership 
(McKinsey & Co., 2010). Another major educational reform of primary and 
lower secondary education has been implemented in the Czech Republic 
since 2007. This time, the policy was devised by left-wing government. The 
reform deepened and institutionalised the previous trends towards the wide 
autonomy of schools in the areas of curriculum and pupil assessment. School-
based curriculum development was the key element of the reform and such 
curricula developed obligatorily by the school staff replaced the traditional 
centralised syllabi. As Figure 1 shows, the degree of autonomy perceived by 
Czech school directors is very high. (The ϐigure compares OECD countries 
only but the data for all countries participating in PISA 2012 would provide 
a similar picture – only Macao, China, would join the group of three countries 
with the maximal values of both dimensions of autonomy.)6
Such wide autonomy (speciϐically the autonomy in resource allocation) 
is believed to be an advantage when balanced by adequate accountability 
measures (OECD, 2011b). This is not the case of Czech schools. This assertion 
may sound as an unsupported claim because the data from PISA 2012 
school questionnaire seem to show an average level of school accountability 
in the Czech Republic when measured by indicators such as the share of 
schools, where school performance is compared against regional or national 
benchmarks or publicly posting the information about pupils’ achievement 
(OECD, 2013c). The responses of Czech directors in the PISA 2012 
questionnaire, however, were probably inϐluenced by their experience with 
the try-outs of large-scale national standardised assessments held in 2012 
and 2013, assessments that were abolished after the new government came 
to power in 2014. While national content standards have been set recently, 
there are no national benchmarks in a strict sense. The tests provided by 
commercial publishers are used by schools on a voluntary basis. As there 
are no rules for posting the test results, there is a wide space for gaming the 
system (as our research illustrated).
6 It is noteworthy that despite the high autonomy and absence of performativity policies, 
neither Czech adolescents nor their teachers seem to be happy in the Czech schools (OECD, 
2013b; OECD, 2014).
924 Dominik Dvořák, Petr Urbánek, Karel Starý
The question arises what effects might result from this rather unique 
combination of high school autonomy, low information accountability and 
considerable school choice in the Czech educational system.
Figure 1. The autonomy of schools in OECD countries as perceived by school 
directors (Data: OECD, 2013c).
1.2 Research questions
The effects of the recent curricular reform have been systematically moni-
tored on the level of upper secondary general education (Janík et al., 2011; 
Píšová et al., 2011). On the level of ISCED 1 and ISCED 2, only a limited num-
ber of features were studied, most of them being the beliefs and attitudes 
of teachers or parents (Moree, 2013; Straková, 2010, 2013; Straková et al., 
2013; Walterová et al., 2010). Our longitudinal research adds to the existing 
knowledge on reforms in transition countries. The main emphasis is put on 
the interaction between the processes of inner school development and the 
top-down mandated educational reform.
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We have two broad goals: (1) The study of the effects of structural properties 
of the Czech compulsory education system (e. g. organisational unity of 
primary and lower secondary levels within single school organizations; the 
early selection of pupils into selective grammar schools and “comprehensive” 
tracks; the school choice, the absence of national monitoring of outcomes) on 
learning and teaching in individual schools. (2) The school and classroom level 
change processes (changes in learning, teaching and school management) in 
the context of the major national curricular reform. 
In this paper, we would like to answer the following two research questions:
1.  What mechanisms of change can be identiϐied in the ϐive schools in the 
past ϐive years?
2.  How do the schools cope with the unique situation of high autonomy and 
low accountability?
2 Methods
In the years 2007–2008 and 2012–2013, we studied the current picture of 
teaching, learning and instructional leadership in ϐive Czech basic schools 
(i.e. comprehensive primary and lower secondary schools) using the research 
design of qualitative multiple case study (Stake, 2005). The multiple case 
study is particularly suitable for the analysis of the common social norms 
and constraints behind the everyday work of individual schools, as well as for 
the description of unique contextual inϐluences. The longitudinal design and 
time frame of the study enabled us to look at medium to long-term effects of 
policy changes.
2.1 Sample
A set of ϐive schools from different parts of the Czech Republic was chosen 
by theoretical sampling, based on the assumptions about the role of context, 
particularly the degree of competition for pupils among neighbouring schools. 
Although not a representative sample, the schools represent different types 
(state/Catholic; urban/suburban/rural; small/medium/large school). All of 
them, however, are comprehensives and serve children in grades 1–9. Only 
one school, dubbed here as Selective, used to be a specialised school focused 
on foreign language teaching but this special proϐile has been somewhat 
fading in recent years as many other schools make English their priority and 
two foreign languages must be taught in every school now.
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At the beginning of the study two of the schools faced serious problems with 
a lack of pupils due to parents’ preference of other schools in the community 
(the Small school) or due to frequent pupil transitions to selective grammar 
schools after grade 5 or after grade 7 (the Selective school). On the contrary, 
two schools (Highlands and Diverse) had very stable pupil populations. One 
school had been expanding quickly and operating above the full capacity 
because the new suburbs in the immediate vicinity supplied plenty of 
children (Suburban).
2.2 Data collection and analysis
The main data collection was performed in the ϐirst year of the reform7 and 
again ϐive years later. Extensive triangulation of methods and data sources 
was used to collect data from the schools. Besides interviewing the teachers 
and school administrators, we observed both classroom instruction and 
extracurricular activities. The school curricula, inspection reports and 
other documents were analysed as well. The pupils of grades 6 and 9 were 
interviewed using the focus group method. These mainly qualitative data 
were supplemented by staff’s social climate measurements (questionnaire 
OCDQ-RS). In this paper, we use mainly the data from the interviews with 
school leaders and staff and from school documents.
The data were coded and narrative descriptions were constructed for each 
case stressing its unique context and the change (or stability) of leadership 
and teaching practices. Finally, the cross-case analysis using cross-case 
displays was performed, looking for the key issues that emerged in the single 
cases and topics. The data collection and analysis is described in detail by 
Dvořák et al. (2010).
To enhance the quality and credibility of our study, we used the sequential 
research design. The individual case (school) studies followed one another. 
In this way all three authors took part in ϐield research in every school and 
contributed to the case report (investigator triangulation). Despite that, all 
possible sources of bias have not been avoided: all three researchers are 
middle-aged white males which might inϐluence our perspective. Our stance 
is inϐluenced by our autobiography (Ball, 2000). We all spent half of our lives 
7 In school year 2007–2008 all schools had to use new curricula developed by the school staff 
in the 1st and 6th grades. In the following years the new curricula have been introduced to all 
grades.
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under the Communist rule. The idea of judging and comparing individuals 
and schools based on measurable outputs (performativity) may be attractive 
to us because in Communist state the status and incentives depended mainly 
on one’s class origin and manifested Party loyalty instead of abilities or hard 
work. We felt this possible source of bias should be declared here.
Another technique used to enhance the quality of research was member 
checking (participant validation): every draft case report was presented 
to the school management and volunteers from the staff, and the comments 
obtained were used to improve the report. As a result of the long-term contact 
with the schools, high level of rapport was built with some respondents. 
In some cases the information provided to us seemed to be very open 
and honest.
3 Results
The qualitative data on the effects of school choice, resource and curriculum 
autonomy are presented.
3.1 The school choice
Five years ago the effects of market mechanisms (school choice) introduced 
in the 1990s were clearly seen in the schools in urban areas like the Small 
school and the Selective school. In the Small school the lack of pupils due 
to parents’ preference of other schools in the area contributed to school 
restructuring: The school director and his deputy were replaced. After the 
new director had been appointed, half of the old staff left and new teachers 
were hired. Since then the school’s situation has changed signiϐicantly. The 
number of pupils exceeded the school capacity as two thirds of the ϐirst 
graders come out of the catchment area now. In the absence of information 
accountability, the increase in the quantity of pupils is the main tactical goal 
and the main indicator of the school improvement. When asked “How would 
you characterise the situation of your school at the moment?”, the school 
director talked mainly about the steady growth of pupils’ intake. The only 
other point he mentioned was the stability of the staff in the last years. So the 
pupils’ results are not explicitly considered.
Today the school choice is taking ground even in the semi-rural Highland 
school area. The Highland school is a single school in a small town 
(2.8 thousand inhabitants). For geographic and social reasons we expected 
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the least favourable conditions for parent’s choice to be here. Five years ago 
market forces did not press on change. Many people in the community work 
in blue-collar jobs, some are migrant workers from Slovakia. The educational 
aspirations of local families are not high. The school is in a hilly region and 
the next fully organised school (i. e. school with grades 1–9) is approx. 7 km 
away in a similar small town (dubbed in this research Lipová). Despite 
that, the school displays a number of favourable features. It has very stable 
staff and very good staff climate. The school can be regarded as a learning 
community – all teachers participate in ongoing development of their ICT 
skills. The effects of this effort are clearly visible in the wide and skilled use 
of computers and interactive whiteboards in instruction.
Between the Highland community and Lipová lies the village of Lhota (5 km 
away from the Highland school). Every year some half-dozen children leave 
the village nursery. Lhota is closer to Lipová (the distance is 3 km) and 
belongs to Lipová catchment area8. 
It was a tradition that all children from Lhota went automatically to school in 
Lipová no matter where the parents commuted to. The parents did not choose. 
Now the pattern has changed. In recent years half of the children from Lhota enter 
our ϐirst grade and half of them go to Lipová, 
reports the Highland school director and admits that she visits the Lhota 
nursery and “talks to the parents”. So not only the afϐluent urban parents are 
exercising their right to choose today.
The competition for enrolment also limits the co-operation or networking of 
the neighbouring schools, mainly to extra-curricular activities (like athletic 
events such as those in the Suburban school). Schools are very reluctant to 
share what they regard as the key know-how related to the core educational 
processes. First signs of the different approach could be found in the 
Small school, where a genuine effort to help a struggling school in vicinity 
was observed.
The school choice in the absence of national benchmarks led to the para-
doxical situation in the Suburban area. In this rapidly growing community 
there are two schools not far away from each other, one of them being the 
Suburban. The Suburban school has plenty of pupils now and had to increase 
its capacity recently due to its demographic context.
8 Catchment areas were not abolished but parents are free to choose the school out of the area.
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Attracting all pupils from the catchment area seems to be more of a question 
of prestige than an economic need. Surprisingly, the challenging standards for 
its pupils the school tries to set and maintain might be an obstacle in this effort. 
The school serves very diverse children population from both (upper-) 
middle class families from newly built suburbs and those from more rural 
parts of the catchment area. The school faces the problem of very diverse 
parent expectations. During our 2013 visits to the Suburban school, teachers 
expressed their worries that some parents would transfer their children to the 
other school in the area to avoid the (perceived) high demands in Suburban 
school. Indeed, parents complain about what they perceive as too demanding 
standards e.g. in secondary history and physical education classes. Since the 
national curricular framework is very vague and national benchmarks for 
the subjects are not being set, the school director (P. E. teacher himself) 
was lacking the foundation to evaluate the history teacher’s approach. The 
science teacher in the same school reports similar problems: “I don’t know 
how to convince [both parents and pupils] that my requirements really are 
at the very minimum.” 
In all studied schools, parents exercise their right to choose the school. 
The Selective school is often attended by children from Christian families 
living outside the catchment area but the size of the building limits the 
possibility to increase the school intake. Sometimes, like in the Small one, 
the increasing intake seems to be regarded as an important or even the main 
reliable indicator of school success. It is interesting to note that some schools 
do genuinely improve in the absence of the strong pressure of school choice 
(Highlands) or even try to maintain the demanding standards at the price 
of losing some pupils (Suburban). In the latter case the school choice might 
mean that some parents would choose another school with less demanding 
academic standards.
3.2 Curricular autonomy and goals of education
Many authors worry that the test-based accountability and output evalua tions 
reduce the school curricula to the tested core subjects (typically literacy and 
numeracy skills). Yet the high curriculum autonomy may lead to another form 
of reduction as well. When talking about their curricular priorities, all schools 
more or less focused on quality of English (or broadly foreign) language tea-
ching and learning – three school leaders mentioned it as the top task of their 
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school development. The foreign languages (and ICT skills) are perceived as 
the most important outcome of education in the Small school by the deputy 
director: “We work hard to prepare these kids in the best way. This means 
these [foreign] languages, these computers.” Market mechanism is probably 
at work here as the English language is a skill highly valued by Czech parents 
(Walterová et al., 2010). Therefore other subjects or skills might get less 
attention. Indeed, some data from commercial testing companies suggest that 
English is the subject where Czech pupils have improved during past years.
Table 2 
Some evidence related to curricular narrowing
Diverse school, Director
I feel we improved the [foreign] languages compared to previous 
years, but we might have a problem in mathematics, we score far 
better in languages than in mathematics.
Diverse school, Teacher
The kids are overloaded with [foreign] languages. And CLIL is 
being introduced despite we [the teachers] do not speak English.
Highland (ϐield notes)
The school puts special emphasis on ICT and English for all seven 
years we follow it. This is probably one of the reasons pupils 
do not leave for eight-year grammar schools at all.
Selective school, Director
Our ϐirst improvement goal is strengthening of the foreign 
language teaching. We revised the school curriculum and allocated 
some extra lessons to foreign languages. Next year we would like 
to provide the opportunities for foreign language talk during 
afternoon or extracurricular programmes.
Selective school, Primary 
teacher
This is a renowned school. It is widely known we maintain the 
standards, we have these languages, and we are open to these kids 
with learning disorders or behaviour issues or so.
Small school, Deputy 
director
Simply, our goal has been that the kids learn one foreign language 
really well. We have some subsidies so we can teach English from 
grade one.
Suburban, Social studies 
teacher
What do we want from the kids after all? All subjects except 
Czech, maths, and, well, a foreign language, are only marginal. The 
kids say: “Silly geography. Silly history. They cannot let me fail in 
geography or history.”
We have seen, however, that the Suburban school tries to instil the traditional 
broad curriculum. The management dares risk the conϐlict with parents 
over the challenging standards even in non-core subjects of history and P. E. 
One reason for this might be that the surplus of school-age children due to 
a demographic boom in the local community gives the management the real 
curricular autonomy. Thus the management can follow a bit conservative 
curricular policy (for good and bad).
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In the absence of national standardised testing, some schools (such as 
Selective or Suburban) use their own non-standardised assessment tools 
developed by the school staff or purchase the tests from commercial 
providers (Small or Selective). When the school leaders repeatedly use their 
home-made tests, they can monitor the changes of average achievement 
from year to year but they cannot compare their school results with other 
schools or with regional or national performance. This is in agreement with 
macro-level data on the purposes of pupil assessment in the Czech Republic 
(OECD, 2013c, p. 149). Subject Olympiads in academic domains (e.g. regional 
mathematical or science Olympiad) and the results of athletic and artistic 
competitions are used as a proxy indicator of school quality as well.
Schools that use external commercial testing services sometimes post the 
results publicly but the director of Small school admits the strategic choice of 
released test data. The Small school is still coping with the legacy of previous 
school management. The classes in grades 7–9 are very small (around 
10 pupils) and the share of pupils at risk in these grades is above average.9 
The high variance of the test results in such a small groups is obvious. 
Therefore the director carefully chooses the data that shall be publicised – 
the less favourable data are used for internal purposes only. This practice is 
in technical agreement with the law as the school is obliged neither to take 
the test nor to publish the results.
3.3 Low accountability and the issues of equity
The goals of accountability policies usually include not only the promotion of 
excellence, but also the increase in equity. In the Czech schools studied, the 
inequality of educational opportunity is perceived (Table 3) but schools have 
not established systematic policies to overcome it. According to the director 
of the Selective school, in case of underachievement
it depends more or less on parents – if they are genuinely interested and want to 
do something. When the family does not collaborate, [our effort] is just a waste of 
time. The child cannot make it alone.
When asked about the measures for overcoming socio-economic disadvan-
tages, some teachers or school leaders start talking about possible medical 
conditions of underachieving pupils (like chronical disease or ADHD). They 
9 There were ϐive times more ϐirst-graders than nine-graders in the Small school in the 
academic year 2012–2013.
933 High autonomy and low accountability: Case study of ﬁ ve Czech schools
add they try to learn more about the special-needs children. So the problem 
of underachievement is seen as of individual rather than social origin. Most 
often the school management reports that the form and intensity of support 
is at the discretion of individual teachers. A typical available opportunity is 
the second chance to take the test. 
Table 3 
Cross-case data on attitudes to the disadvantaged children
Diverse, Teacher
The biggest trouble is dealing with the kids from the disadvantaged 
families. In case of a lower socioeconomic level of the family, the 
potential of those kids if often higher than the actual support in 
their family. They could advance but the stimuli from the family are 
missing. This is a kid that could go on, he or she has some talents 
but lacks stimulation. And then these kids mix with the children 
from well-situated families at school and new problems emerge…
We try to deal with these issues. We attend courses. If there is 
a short-term course, somebody from our school attends. I believe 
we try to learn about it. The school does not neglect it. We have 
a counsellor and a school psychologist. So if we encounter the 
problem in the classroom, we deal with it.
Highlands, Director
There is quite a large group of disadvantaged pupils here but it 
is not extremely large. We can deal with it. The support is up to 
the teachers. They provide some extra help after the classes or 
maybe before the classes. There is no system organized by the 
school management. Some kids need help from time to time, so 
the teacher intervenes. Mrs. K. [the math teacher] is at school one 
hour before the classes every day, so the kids automatically come 
and ask her for the help. And me too. I am here every morning 
too. They can come and try the test again or so. So the terms are 
negotiated with the individual pupil.
Highlands, Teacher
There are some kids that lack ambitions or motivation. What 
do you want to do with it? It is all in the families. See, I know those 
people. I live here, so I know the parents. I taught them too. You can 
just be sorry. I just say, oh my God. I like these kids and I believe 
some will change their attitudes when they grow older. But if you 
know the families – what can be expected from the kids? I have my 
limits. I am not a social worker. […] This is my defence as well, I am 
not their mom, surely not.
Selective, Director
We monitor the pupils with poor achievement and the solutions 
are discussed the at the staff meetings. Sometimes it is caused by 
the pupil’s intellect. In case of learning disorders we routinely use 
individual educational program. If the achievement problems are 
caused by illness, the homeroom teacher informs the staff and we 
postpone the assessment or requirements are lessened.
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Small, Director
We have many kids with a rather bad social background. It is 
really difϐicult then. We know we cannot rely on the support of the 
family. If the family is dysfunctional, our efforts are desperate. We 
are grateful when such children learn basic habits at school – be 
it work habits or hygienic habits or some social relationships are 
built. It is really a complex challenge in some cases.
We can provide some individualized care in smaller classes. If the 
size of the class is over twenty, it’s difϐicult. It depends a lot on the 
homeroom teacher. The help provided depends a lot on the subject 
teachers in the lower secondary grades. They might prepare some 
extra tasks or they might follow a slightly different path in case 
of some pupils. If they see that the kid does not cope they might 
assign a bit simpliϐied task.
Suburban, Teacher 1
[The children in need of extra care] come from the socially weaker 
families. I have a boy [in my class] and his mom is alone with two 
kids. Well, single parent families. I would say this would be the 
case. And then the athletes, they train ϐive times every week. They 
live in their own world, the priorities are set differently. But most 
of all, single moms. There are many of them and that is where the 
problems are, indeed.
Suburban, Teacher 2
[In case of some children] the lack of support, the profound lack 
of support is obvious. But not at ϐirst sight. [What kind of support 
is available for them?] It is very individual as we lack time. Well, 
it is on the edge. In my case, if they fail the test, they can come 
every morning at 7.15 AM and try the test again. So they would get 
a better grade and the average would be better as well. They have 
this possibility. Some use it and some do not…
This is in agreement with the survey results (Straková, 2010, p. 306) showing 
that the Czech school leaders and teachers do not care much about the relation 
between the pupil’s socioeconomic background and their achievement. This 
complements the fact that the Czech Republic remains to be a country with 
low equity of educational achievement (OECD, 2013b). E. g. the proportion of 
the variation in mathematics performance explained by the socioeconomic 
status of the pupil is relatively very high. There are signiϐicant regional 
disparities in both reading and mathematical literacy (also associated with 
pupil SES).
Table 3
continued
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4 Discussion
Our analysis was focused on three features of the Czech educational policy: 
(1) the freedom of parents to choose a school, (2) the high autonomy and 
(3) low accountability of schools and teachers.
The school choice seems to be a mechanism at work in the Czech compulsory 
schooling. It might take some time before the parents in rural areas (such as 
in the case of the Highland school) start to use their new right. The change 
of culture followed the change of law with a delay. The high curricular 
autonomy granted by the recent reform is not seen as a major change or step 
forward by many teachers in the schools studied. In some sense the reform 
just institutionalised and deepened the trends of the past phases of post-
socialist transition.
Despite the fact that we wanted to study the effects of recent curricular 
reform, we might observe mainly the results of the previous market-oriented 
reforms of the 1990s. Indeed, some authors suggest that the real inϐluence 
of the school system reforms can only be seen in the long-term perspective 
of several decades (Tamir, 2004; Viñao, 2001). The implementation and 
ϐirst results of the Czech curricular reform (launched in 2007) have been 
disappointing on a range of measures (Janík, 2013; Janík et al., 2011; Straková 
et al., 2013) but this conclusion should be seen in the light of the previous 
statement about the short- and long-term perspectives.
The perceived failure of the reforms may be the result of a historical stan-
ce (Viñao, 2001). Indeed, some key steps of the Czech reform schedule (as 
the monitoring of school outcomes or the abolition of elite lower secondary 
grammar schools) that were expected to precede the devolution of respon-
sibilities to schools have not been completed yet. Another and more pessi-
mistic explanation is that the widespread lack of capacity, distrust to tradi-
tional institutions (the Ministry of Education being one of them), and the 
rise of populist parties in the Czech Republic (as in some other countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe) may hinder the implementation of any complex 
reform. The Czech school system might remain stuck in the capability trap 
(Pritchett, 2013; Pritchett, Woolcock, & Andrew, 2010). This is in agreement 
with the note that the expected end of the post-socialist (or post-Commu-
nist) transformation is being postponed repeatedly in relevant literature 
(Greger, 2011).
936 Dominik Dvořák, Petr Urbánek, Karel Starý
The school market in the Czech Republic operates without a key ingredient – 
transparent and comprehensive information on school outcomes. Moreover, 
it is not clear whether parents give sufϐicient priority to their children’s high 
achievement in the core curricular areas when making their choices (OECD, 
2013c). Despite these doubts, PISA 2012 data signal that while “system 
level correlations in PISA do not show a relationship between the degree of 
competition and pupil performance”, at the school level in many countries, 
schools that compete for pupil enrolment with other schools tend to show better 
performance, before accounting for schools’ socio-economic intake. […] Only 
in the Czech Republic and Estonia do schools that compete with other schools 
for pupils in the same area tend to perform better, on average, than schools that 
do not compete, after accounting for the socio-economic status and demographic 
background of pupils and schools and various other school characteristics. 
(OECD, 2013c, p. 54)
So it seems that in the Czech Republic some parents might discover a good 
school without the big data from national assessment while other parents 
might prefer choosing a less demanding (underperforming) school.
The Czech school system features an unusual mixture of high autonomy and 
low outcome accountability. Our research shows that in this hybrid system 
some negative affects ascribed to high-stakes test policies are present as well. 
The load of administrative work is very high despite the facts that almost 
no tests are used in the schools (McKinsey & Co., 2010). The curriculum 
narrowing might happen in a system with no testing in a way similar to the 
system under the pressure of standardised testing. There are more strategies 
of fabrication and impression management (Ball, 2000) than the example 
from the Small school quoted above.
Overcoming socioeconomic disadvantage is usually the key aim of accounta-
bility policies (e.g. No Child Left Behind). While no case we studied could be 
labelled as a school serving severely disadvantaged pupil population, all ϐive 
schools face the problems of children from disadvantaged or dysfunctional 
families.10 But the schools do not tackle the problem of underachievement 
by establishing a school-wide policy of support system (even though some 
provide counselling or psychological help).
10 Least of all probably the Selective school which uses entrance examinations.
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The high level of school autonomy, both over resources and curriculum, 
leads to permanent overload of management. Representative surveys 
(McKinsey and Co., 2010; OECD, 2014) conϐirm that the Czech school leaders 
struggle with administrative tasks and site maintenance issues more than 
their counterparts in many other countries. They also allocate less time to 
instructional leadership.11 That may be one of the reasons why the support of 
underachieving pupils depends on the good will of individual teachers. Given 
the low equity of educational achievement in the Czech Republic, any future 
research shall pay more attention to the issue of equity.
5 Conclusion
The discussion of the risks of (high stake) testing should be complemented 
by a similar analysis of costs and negative effects of the absence of outcome 
accountability. The Czech school system has been facing serious problems 
according to the PISA and TIMSS achievement studies (cf. Mullis et al., 
2012; OECD, 2013a). In this light, the narrowing of curricular core and the 
absence of shared academic standards that we described should be seriously 
considered.
A more balanced approach beyond false dichotomy of accountability vs. 
school autonomy and a new grand narrative “at the intersection of the two” 
duelling narratives is needed (Spillane, 2012; Šíp, 2013) not only in the 
Czech Republic. Different policies shall be seen as complementary and mu-
tually supportive rather than conϐlicting (Hopkins, 2010). All the classroom, 
school, regional and national levels of school system have to be changed 
(Fullan, 2005). But the reliance on just one improvement mechanism (either 
school autonomy or external accountability, a curriculum reform or market 
forces or networking of schools…) is the central fallacy of many school re-
forms (Hopkins, 2013).
11 As the schools are relatively small, they cannot afford large administrative staff. The 
extreme case is the Highland school where there is no administrative staff, the bookkeeping 
is outsourced and the school caretaker teaches some classes (handicraft and design). 
Surprisingly, in the Highland school the staff development is at the very good level.
938 Dominik Dvořák, Petr Urbánek, Karel Starý
References
Ball, S. J. (2000). Performativities and fabrications in the education economy: Towards the 
performative society? Australian Educational Researcher, 27(2), 1–23.
Bellman, J., & Weiß, M. (2009). Risiken und Nebenwirkungen neuer Steuerung im Schulsystem. 
Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 55(2), 286–308.
Bruns, B., Filmer, D., & Petrinos, H. A. (2011). Making schools work. New evidence on accountability 
reforms. Washington: World Bank.
Chua, J. S. M. (2009). Saving the teacher’s soul: exorcising the terrors of performativity. London 
Review of Education, 7(2), 159–167.
de Wolf, I. F., & Janssens, F. J. G. (2007).  Effects and side effects of inspections and accountability 
in education: An overview of empirical studies. Oxford Review of Education, 33(3), 379–396.
Dvořák, D., Starý, K., Urbánek, P., Chvál, M., & Walterová, E. (2010). Česká základní škola: 
Vícepřípadová studie. Praha: Karolinum.
Eurydice. (2009). National testing of pupils in Europe: Objectives, organisation and use of results. 
Brussels: Eurydice.
Fullan, M. (2005, Winter). Tri-level solution. Education Analyst, 4–5.
Greger, D. (2011). Dvacet let českého školství optikou teorií změny vzdělávání v post-
socialistických zemích. Orbis scholae, 5(1), 9–22.
Hopkins, D. (2010). Every school a great school – Realizing the potential of system leadership. In 
A. Hargreaves, A. Lieberman, M. Fullan, & D. Hopkins (Eds.), Second international handbook 
of educational change (pp. 741–764). Heidelberg: Springer.
Hopkins, D. (2013). Exploding the myths of school reform. Centre for Strategic Education Seminar 
Series Paper No. 224. East Melbourne: Centre for Strategic Education.
Janík, T. (2013). Od reformy kurikula k produktivní kultuře vyučování a učení. Pedagogická 
orientace, 23(5), 634–663.
Janík, T., Knecht, P., Najvar, P., Píšová, M., & Slavík, J. (2011). Kurikulární reforma na gymnáziích: 
výzkumná zjištění a doporučení. Pedagogická orientace, 21(4), 375–415.
Kaščák, O., & Pupala, B. (2012). Critical issues in contemporary education: Prolegomena. Human 
Affairs, 22(1), 3–10.
Kaščák, O., & Pupala, B. (2011). PISA v kritickej perspektíve. Orbis Scholae, 5(1), 53–70.
Klieme, E., et al. (2004). The development of national educational standards. Berlin: BMBF.
McKinsey & Co. (2010). Klesající výsledky českého základního a středního školství: fakta a řešení. 
Praha.
Moree, D. (2013). Učitelé na vlnách transformace. Kultura školy před rokem 1989 a po něm. Praha: 
Karolinum.
Mullis, I. V. S., Martin, M. O., Foy, P., & Arora, A. (2012). TIMSS 2011 international results in 
mathematics. Chestnut Hill, MA: TIMSS & PIRLS International Study Center, Boston College.
Neumann, K., Fischer, H. E., & Kauertz, A. (2010). From PISA to educational standards: The 
impact of large-scale assessments on science education in Germany. International Journal 
of Science and Mathematics Education, 8(3), 545–563.
OECD. (2011a). Lessons from PISA for the United States: Strong performers and successful 
reformers in education. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2011b). School autonomy and accountability: Are they related to student performance? 
PISA in focus 9 (October). Paris: OECD Publishing.
939 High autonomy and low accountability: Case study of ﬁ ve Czech schools
OECD. (2013a). PISA 2012 Results: What students know and can do – student performance in 
mathematics, reading and science (Volume I). Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2013b). PISA 2012 results: Ready to learn: students’ engagement, drive and self-beliefs 
(Volume III). Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2013c). PISA 2012 results: What makes schools successful? Resources, policies and 
practices. (Volume IV). Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD. (2014). TALIS 2013 results: An international perspective on teaching and learning. Paris: 
OECD Publishing.
Píšová, M., Kostková, K., Janík, T., Doulík, P., Hajdušková, L., Knecht, P., … & Vlček, P. (2011). 
Kurikulární reforma na gymnáziích. Případové studie tvorby kurikula. Praha: VÚP.
Pritchett, L. (2013). The World Bank and public sector management: What next? International 
Review of Administrative Sciences, 79(3), 413–419.
Pritchett, L., Woolcock, M., & Andrew, M. (2010). Capability traps? The mechanisms of 
persistent implementation failure. CGD Working Paper 234. Washington: Center for Global 
Development.
Spillane, J. P. (2012). The more things change, the more things stay the same? Education and 
Urban Society, 44(2), 123–127.
Stake, R. E. (2005). Multiple case study analysis. New York: Guilford Press.
Straková, J. (2010). Postoje českých učitelů k hlavním prioritám vzdělávací politiky. In 
H. Krykorková & R. Váňová (Eds.), Učitel v současné škole (pp. 167–175). Praha: FF UK.
Straková, J. (2013). Jak dál s kurikulární reformou. Pedagogická orientace, 23(5), 734–743.
Straková, J., Spilková, V., Simonová, J., Friedleandaerová, H., & Hanzák, T. (2013). Názory učitelů 
základních škol na potřebu změn ve školním vzdělávání. Orbis Scholae, 7(1), 79–100.
Šíp, R. (2013). Nové paradigma vědy, nové paradigma vědeckého výzkumu. In L. Gulová & R. Šíp 
(Eds.), Výzkumné metody v pedagogické praxi (pp. 12–37). Praha: Grada.
Štech, S. (2011). PISA – nástroj vzdělávací politiky nebo výzkumná metoda? Orbis Scholae, 5(1), 
123–133.
Tamir, P. (2004). Curriculum implementation revisited. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 36(3), 
281–294.
Tetlock, P. E., Vieider, F M., Patil, S. V., & Grant, A. M. (2013). Accountability and ideology: When 
left looks right and right looks left. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
122(1), 22–35.
Unesco. (2007). Education for all by 2015: Will we make it? Paris: author.
Viñao, A. (2001, Fall). Do education reforms fail? A historian’s response. Encounters on Education, 
2, 27–47.
Walterová, E., Černý, K., Greger, D., & Chvál, M. (2010). Školství – věc (ne)veřejná? Názory 
veřejnosti na školu a vzdělávání. Praha: Karolinum.
West, M. R., & P. E. Peterson. (2006). The efϐicacy of choice threats within accountability systems: 
Results from legislatively induced experiments. The Economic Journal, 116(March), C46–
C62.
940 Dominik Dvořák, Petr Urbánek, Karel Starý
Authors
Dominik Dvořák, Ph.D., Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Education, Institute for 
Research and Development of Education, Myslíkova 7, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic, 
e-mail: dominik.dvorak@pedf.cuni.cz
Associate Professor Petr Urbánek, Dr., Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Education, 
Institute for Research and Development of Education, Myslíkova 7, 110 00 Prague, Czech 
Republic, e-mail: petr.urbanek@tul.cz
Karel Starý, Ph.D., Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Education, Institute for Research 
and Development of Education, Myslíkova 7, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic, 
e-mail: karel.stary@pedf.cuni.cz
Vysoká autonomie, malá akontabilita: 
Případová studie pěti českých škol
Abstrakt: Článek upozorňuje na efekty vysoké úrovně autonomie při současné nízké 
odpovědnosti za výsledky v případě českých základních škol. Jsou načrtnuty základní 
principy akontability jako klíčového pojmu současné vzdělávací politiky a stručně je 
popsán použitý výzkumný plán. Pak jsou představena data ilustrující efekty volby 
školy, autonomie školy v oblasti alokace zdrojů a kurikulární decentralizace. V diskusi 
je mj. zmíněn problém časové škály pro hodnocení efektů reformy a otevřena otázka 
potřeby nového přístupu k autonomii a akontabilitě škol. Po dobu více než pěti let 
sledujeme za použití převážně kvalitativních longitudinálních postupů vývoj pěti 
českých plně organizovaných základních škol. Výsledky naznačují, že některé efekty, 
považované za negativní a připisované plošnému testování a na něj navázaným 
politikám, lze překvapivě pozorovat ve zkoumaných školách, ačkoli v český vzdělávací 
systém řadu prvků akontability nezavedl. Současná bohatá literatura o rizicích 
spojených s plošným testováním by si zasloužila doplnění o studie rizik a negativních 
efektů projevujících se tam, kde výsledky žáků nejsou systematicky sledovány 
a využívány.
Klíčová slova: rozvoj školy, vzdělávací reforma, tranzice, Česká republika, vícepřípa-
dová studie
